“Is love the love of something or is love the love of someone, or another”?

When we say we love someone, what does it mean?
Do we (and is it possible to) love that person as a phenomenological absolute and homogenous whole (the who), or do we love the aspects that the person possess, which can include discrete qualities, properties, traits, and characteristics [the what]?

Let’s say that I love you. Do I love you as a person (inclusive of everything) or as a collection of certain things? Do I love your face, your eyes, your breasts, your brain? Or do I love you as a being under the condition a whole person of a person from an ontological perspective?

Whenever talk about why we are attracted or not attracted to somebody, isn’t it true that we always say we like this and that (thing) about that person. While we don’t like this and that of that person, etc?

I think often times we have desires for somebody because they have certain idiosyncratic X and Y things that we look for in a mate. And when we first meet somebody new, you assume that you have a lot of (things) in common with the other person’s X and Y.

But the way I see it is that every one of us is made out of thousands of this and that (things): quirks, habits, behaviors, beliefs, traits, and episodes of experiences. And if you just look hard enough, you are bound to find certain coincidences and little quirks and experiences that you have in common with the other person. And usually when we first meet somebody, we deliberately look for these things to talk about in order to connect and identify with the other person while disregarding or forgetting about the other thousands of quirks and this and that and such and such that the other person has that are different from our own this and that, X and Y (things).

Love fades and dies when we (with time) begin to realize these differences. People usually don’t stop loving a person because of who they are, but because it appears that the other person’s “this and that” and “the such and such (thing)” are not compatible with our own X and Ys, or that they lack the X and Ys we looked for and thought they possess when we first encountered them.

This leads to the question of being , or “to be”? Is to be someone or of something? Can we be true to and perceive someone as a ontological and metaphysical singularity of a whole without objectifying the X and Y and other ‘stuff’ or ‘things’ that make up of that person? Is the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ separable, and Is love threatened because of the dichotomy and the duality of what and who?

Maybe the “who” and the “what” are synthesized premises. Isn’t X and Y of somebody parts of the irreplaceable and discrete whole? We can like another person for their X and Y and not be true to him or her as a whole, but not so the other way around. When we accept a person as a unified singularity, there is no other way around; we almost have to be true to his or her idiosyncratic this and that (things of X and Y).